The Metaethics of Maat by DeLapp, Kevin
 1 
*This is a pre-print version of the chapter to appear in the volume Comparative Metaethics: 
Neglected Perspectives on the Foundations of Morality, ed. Colin Marshall (Routledge, 
forthcoming). Please do not cite without author permission. 
 





 Maat (mꜣꜥt) was a central category in ancient Egyptian philosophy. Its extension covers 
the domains of both justice and truth, and it was frequently personified as a goddess with a 
special role in adjudicating the afterlife and justifying dynastic rule. Maat has long been 
recognized as integral to ancient Egyptian thought and there have been several sustained 
analyses of the roles it might play vis-à-vis first-order moral principles. Yet, there has been no 
systematic metaethical examination of it. In this paper, I argue that maat should be recovered as 
an important historical and cross-cultural contribution to metaethics. Specifically, I’ll suggest 
that maat gives us a vision of the world itself as language-dependent in a way that disrupts key 
assumptions of the modern realist/anti-realist dichotomy. 
Two caveats are in order. First, I dismiss from the start any prejudice that ancient 
Egyptian thought is not properly philosophical. Within Egyptology there has been much debate 
about how, or even if, we can talk about ancient Egyptian ‘morality’ in any way commensurate 
with modern Western sensibilities. Skeptics on this issue argue that the relevant source material 
from ancient Egypt belongs to the genre of ‘wisdom’ literature, in contrast with more systematic 
or self-aware ‘philosophy’—somewhat along a parallel with the alleged mythos/logos 
                                                        
1 For helpful comments on an early version of this chapter, I am indebted to Jeremy Henkel, Dave Holiday, Ben 
McCraw, and Casey Woodling. Colin Marshall, Megan Wu, and the other participants at the 2018 Seattle Lost 
Voices conference also provided extremely valuable feedback. 
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distinction.2 Such skeptics forget that, for most of the history of Western philosophy, it was taken 
as a truism that philosophical thought originated in places like Egypt.3 For the purposes of our 
present analysis, I will simply assume that the material I’ll be sourcing from ancient Egypt is at 
least generically ‘philosophical’ enough to justify our metaethical conversation with it. When, as 
we shall see, Egyptian texts make claims about souls, truth and reality, political legitimacy, 
theodicy, and proper forms of behavior, it certainly seems prima facie that they’re doing 
something recognizably philosophical. 
The second caveat is that, as with any comparative cultural endeavor, we must resist 
essentialism about ancient Egypt. ‘Ancient Egypt’ spanned thousands of years, and its 
inhabitants may not have accepted the diachronic identity we attribute to them today.4 Moreover, 
the primary sources we’ll be looking at frequently pertain mainly to royal and scribal classes, and 
so might not characterize the thought of laborers or other non-elites.5 Furthermore, the material 
that ends up getting preserved through so many generations is sometimes pretty random. But in 
this regard, the hermeneutic challenges facing the present project are at least no greater than 
those facing other Egyptological or other comparative philosophical endeavors. With these two 
caveats in mind, let us look more closely at maat. 
                                                        
2 Assmann (1991), for instance, argues that we differentiate ancient Egyptian morality proper from the ‘mere’ 
hortatory injunctions of wisdom literature. For an argument against this, and a recognition of the hermeneutic 
necessity of linking the two domains, see Lichtheim (1997, 89-99). For an overview of the Egyptological debate 
concerning how best to characterize the genres of the relevant literature, see Lichtheim (1997, 1-8). 
3 See Park (2013, 70-74) for documentation about the forces and motives behind the gradual erasure of Egypt from 
the philosophical canon. James (1954) suggests that the ancient Greeks and Romans themselves recognized their 
philosophical debt to Egypt, although James contends that Hellenistic authors deliberately and systematically 
suppressed this fact. James’s more controversial charges are expanded in Bernal (1987) and critiqued in Lefkowitz 
& Rogers (1996). The James-Bernal perspective has become formative within Black Studies interventions in 
Egyptology, where maat in particular has received special attention (e.g., Karenga 2004). Although the present 
investigation of maat is not aimed at the same political or reclamation projects as these other interventions, I hope it 
is consistent with them. 
4 For different perspectives on ancient Egyptians’ sense of their own history, see the essays in Tait (2003). 
5 Maat does not, for example, seem to play a very prominent role in the archaeological materials we have from the 
ancient laboring community of Deir el-Medina—neither in the medical evidence (Borghouts 1994) nor in the visual 
or decorative elements of the village (Friedman 1994). 
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1. Truth, Justice, and the Egyptian Way 
 Egyptologists typically translate maat as ‘truth’ or ‘justice’, without much thought as to 
how that disjunction could be coherently inclusive or what kind of metaphysics of morals might 
be involved.6 The word was graphically represented in slightly different ways, most commonly 
as either ‘𓐙𓏏𓁦’ or just ‘𓐙𓏏’, but sometimes (less frequently) in its full phonetic form 
‘𓐙𓌳𓂝𓁦’. In inscriptions, it is often contrasted with a category called isfet (izf.t 𓇋𓊃𓆑𓏏𓅨), 
typically translated as ‘chaos’ or ‘strife’.7 The etymology of maat—and we should be wary when 
we speak of ‘etymology’ in the context of a glyph-based script such as ancient Egyptian8—
suggests straightness, levelness, and measure, and the word might be cognate with other words 
meaning ‘direction/wish’ (mꜣꜥ 𓐙𓌳𓂝) and ‘sacrifice’ (mꜣꜥ 𓐙𓌳𓂝𓏛).9 
 As a personified deity10, Maat is depicted as a young woman with one or more feathers 
(possibly of an ostrich) atop her head (𓁦), and often holds in her hands an animal-topped scepter 
(wꜣs 𓌀) and an ankh-symbol of life (ꜥnḫ 𓋹). She sits with other gods during the judging of the 
                                                        
6 Other prominent and more philosophically-loaded renderings include: “world order” (Anthes 1952), “integrative 
harmony” (O’Connor 2001, 163), “the status quo” (Tyldesley 1998, 71), “the totality of all social norms” (Assmann 
1996, 127), and “the equilibrium which the universe has reached through the process of creation, enabling it to 
conform to its true nature” (Grimal 1988, 47). 
7 For a deeper analysis of the maat/isfet binary, see Harry Smith (1994) who makes the case that each category is the 
absolute negation of the other. Isfet is not the only word in ancient Egyptian for ‘bad things’ or ‘evil’, nor is it the 
only antonym of maat. But then again, neither is maat the only word used to refer to ‘good things,’ even in a moral 
sense: importantly, the aesthetic category nefer (nfr 𓄤) has significant ethical extensions, ones that are also bound up 
with maat (see Cannon-Brown 2006, 10-18). However, isfet seems to have a somewhat wider and more cosmic 
scope than other negative terms, and it is isfet that occurs most explicitly in conjunction with maat. Hence, isfet is 
most germane to our present argument. See Bleeker (1966, 6n2-3) for a list of other words that occupy nearby 
semantic space with maat and isfet.  
8 For an analysis of some of the many ways in which Egyptian hieroglyphs defy modern Western assumptions about 
language, see Jespersen & Reintges (2008), who take particular aim at the Wittgensteinian tradition of treating 
hieroglyphs as ‘pictures’—a tradition that has its roots in Europe’s earliest (pre-Champollion) encounters with the 
hieroglyphs, when it was popular to think of them as crude, but perhaps mystical pictograms. 
9 Westendorf (1966, 202-25). 
10 Tobin (1989, 79) argues that the deified Maat was a later development of the basic moral category. 
Occasionally—e.g., Unas Pyramid Text 317 (Lichtheim 2006a, 40) and Book of the Dead 125 (Budge 1895, 193-
202)—the goddess’s written name or pictorial representation is given in a double form, perhaps signifying the 
dualism of maat as both divinity and moral category, or the fact that maat was considered cosmically all-
encompassing (Budge 1895, cxix). 
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deceased’s heart-mind (ib 𓄣𓏤), an image we’ll be returning to later.11 The goddess evolves to have 
special connections with the pharaoh: she becomes incorporated into the name (prenomen) of the 
ruler and the iconography of the royal throne even seems to take on her abstracted form, making 
her literally foundational to the pharaoh’s political legitimacy.12 Another recurrent motif renders 
Maat in miniature, where she is offered by the hand of the pharaoh to other gods who ritually 
ingest her.13 It will bear to keep in mind such associations with names and rituals when we 
consider below the philosophy of language that seems to underwrite maat. 
 Independent of its deified form, maat appears prominently in moral teachings, especially 
in the Instructions (sbꜣyt 𓋴𓃀𓇼𓄿𓇋𓇋𓏏𓏛) genre, in lamentations about the fallen state of the world, 
and in evaluations of people’s moral character or the success of a pharaoh’s rule. Scribal 
autobiographical inscriptions frequently testify to their author’s good character by declaring that 
he had been reliable in speech and not quarrelsome to others—two key features of maat, as we’ll 
come to appreciate.14 
 One who would devote herself to maat is a maaty (mꜣꜥty 𓐙𓏛𓀀)—that is, a maat-aspirant. 
Succeeding as a maaty during one’s life is sometimes presented as a necessary and sufficient 
condition for admission to the Egyptian afterlife (dwꜣt 𓂧𓍯𓏏𓇽). As famously depicted in the 
Book of the Dead, when a person dies—that is, when their animating life force (kꜣ 𓂓𓏤) has vacated 
their physical body (ẖt 𓄡𓏏𓏤)—what remains of them, their name (rn 𓂋𓈖), is presented before 
the gods (amongst them the goddess Maat) who weigh the contents of their heart-mind (ib 𓄣𓏤) on 
                                                        
11 See, for example, the stela inscription (British Museum 142) in Kitchen (1980, 218-19). 
12 For examples of the incorporation of maat into royal names, note for instance: Hatshepsut as Maatkere, 
Amunhotep III as Nebmaatre, Ramesses II as Wsermaatre, etc. The graphic similarities between maat and the throne 
are noted by Kuhlmann (1977, 94n1). For other symbolic associations of the pharaonic throne with maat, see 
Kuhlmann (2011). 
13 On the ingestion iconography and theology, see Faraone & Teeter (2004) who note similarities to depictions of the 
goddess Metis within Greek myth. A comprehensive analysis of the changing ways this ritual was depicted 
throughout the New Kingdom can be found in Teeter (1997). For an opposing view, which instead sees maat largely 
receding in ethical significance post-Amarna, see Assmann (1993). 
14 Lichtheim (1992) provides a comprehensive analysis of the way maat is expressed in Egyptian autobiographies.  
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a scale against the feather of maat.15 The deceased must recite a formulaic litany of offenses of 
which they assert themselves to be innocent, and their heart-mind grows heavier any time they 
lie.16 Thus, one’s name is importantly bound up with who one essentially is, and salvation is 
reserved for those whose name measures up to their actions in life. 
 Precisely who could be a maaty, and how, were contested questions within Egyptian 
philosophy. Sometimes maat is depicted as universally attainable, other times Egyptians use it to 
distinguish themselves from barbarians.17 Sometimes the pharaoh seems to occupy a special 
position as an earthly conduit of maat for the rest of the land.18 Other times, even lowly peasants 
get to wield maat to speak truth to power.19 And we find ancient dialogues that explicitly debate 
whether one can become maaty just through personal effort or whether some people’s natures are 
hopeless.20 
 These questions about the scope and admissions criteria for being maaty aren’t germane 
to our present metaethical investigation, but they do help illustrate the essentially contested and 
highly self-aware place of maat in Egyptian thought. What we can already appreciate 
metaethically is that, regardless of what special roles may have been envisioned for the pharaoh 
                                                        
15 The Egyptian conception of personhood is fascinating and complex, although we should not assume that there was 
necessarily any determinate or universally agreed-upon way of organizing the different aspects of personhood that 
are recognized in different texts. 
16 The Book of the Dead 125 (Budge 1895, 193-202) lists the 42 ‘negative confessions’ the deceased must assert, 
corresponding to the 42 ‘assessors’ (šsw 𓌞𓋴𓅱𓂻𓏥) who attend Maat and feed on maat and who each represent a 
different particular form of isfet to be avoided, e.g., theft, murder, etc. 
17 Janzen (2013, 12-17).  
18 For instance, Pepi I Pyramid Texts 573 tells us that the pharaoh uniquely “lives on/by maat” (Lichtheim 2006a: 
49). Lichtheim (1997, 12) summarizes the pharaoh’s role thus: “It was in himself that the Egyptian found the 
knowledge of Maat… The awesome king stood for righteous government, for he desired that Maat be done; but 
knowledge of Maat belonged to every man.” 
19 For example, in the Tale of the Eloquent Peasant (Lichtheim 2006a, 66), a governing magistrate comes to marvel 
at the maat of a lowborn and unsophisticated commoner. 
20 The debate about moral meritocracy is made explicit in the Instruction of Ani, where a father defends the 
egalitarianism of maat (noting that even a crooked stick left on the ground can be turned into a noble’s staff) against 
his son, who subscribes to the more fatalistic and aristocratic view that “everyone is drawn by their own nature” 
(Lichtheim 2006b, 135-45). Similarly, the Instruction of Ptahhotep (Lichtheim 2006a, 66) asserts that one might 
become a “person of worth” (s-iḳr 𓋴𓀀 𓇋𓈎𓂋𓏛) solely through one’s own efforts. 
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or scribal elites, maat is deeply concerned with language. To do or uphold maat, or to be maaty, 
is to speak and be spoken of in certain ways. As we have seen, being judged worthy of 
immortality is a matter of having one’s name cleared and being weighed (literally) against one’s 
words. The ‘vindication’ (mꜣꜥ ḫrw 𓐙𓌳𓂝 𓐍𓂋𓅱) of a deceased maaty means literally “to be 
proven true by speech” or “to be true to one’s words.”21 Thus, in order to better understand the 
meaning of maat, we must try to understand the background philosophy of language that was 
operative in maaty contexts. 
 
2. The Khat is on the Maat: Philosophy of Language and Egyptian Ritual 
Language is the primary generative force in Egyptian metaphysics. The inaugural act of 
the universe is creation ex nihilo by means of speech.22 The tongue and the mouth are the 
dominant motifs of Egyptian cosmogony23, with Ptah creating first by utterance and then by 
continuing to “control all things” by being “in their mouths”.24 Speaking is making, words 
constitute reality—this is performative utterance taken to an extreme.25 (We’ll be returning to 
speech-act theory at the end of section three below.) The words of mortals can partake of these 
divine powers. For instance, the pharaoh is able to “fell his foe with the power of his speech,” 
which enables the cosmos “to glide on its way in joy.”26 Warriors are victorious when they act as 
                                                        
21 See for instance the Amarna tomb inscription of general Ramose (Hornung 1995, 102). And see Anthes (1954) for 
an overview of the contested translation history of ḫrw in this context. 
22 Perhaps in anticipation of the looming ad infinitum problem here, Coffin Text 1130 describes the first speaker as 
“he with the secret name.” 
23 Note, for instance, the etymological associations of ‘mouth’ (rꜣ 𓂋𓏤) with the fact that temples and shrines were 
literally ‘mouth-houses’ (rꜣ pr 𓂋𓏤 𓉐𓏤). 
24 Memphite Theology (Lichtheim 2006a, 51-57). 
25 If it helps (it very well might not!), this somewhat magical view of language that I shall be attributing to Egyptian 
maaty ritual might be seen as roughly similar to a variety of historical views of logos as found, for example, within 
Hellenistic Stoicism and Middle Platonism, or in the Gospel of John, or even the so-called ‘panlogism’ associated 
with Hegel. (See Williams 2016 for an overview of different historical versions of the logos doctrine, and see 
Eisenberg 1990 for a critical assessment of the Hegelian version.) 
26 Text from Medinet Habu VI, plates 422-23 (Hughes, et al. 1963). 
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“creators through speech.”27 When a maaty speaks (ḏd 𓆓𓂧𓊽), “it happens…such a one is like a 
god.”28 And all people regardless of social position are enjoined not merely to make sounds, but 
to use specifically “divine words” (mdw nṯr 𓌃𓀁 𓊹) and thereby to “speak as magic” (ḏd m ḥkꜣ 𓆓𓂧 
𓐝 𓎛𓂓𓏛) and “fill the ears of Horus with maat.”29 
This generative power of speech extends to the physical world. Physical things decay, but 
can be recreated through the linguistic reinvestments that are expressed in the maaty rituals. The 
body or khat (ẖt 𓄡𓏏𓏤) is animated by the spirit (bꜣ 𓅡𓏤) that inhabits it, and bodies are preserved 
and renewed when their spirits are maaty. For then they respect and ritually participate in the 
recreation of the primordial order. In a literal way for the ancient Egyptians, bodies are at least 
partially constituted by normative relations we have to them, in terms of proper ritual observance 
and the accuracy of our memories and linguistic attributions. Within this philosophy of language, 
we might say, in good Analytic idiom, that the khat is (dependent) on the maat.30 
 The generative dimension of speech is also evident in ancient Egyptian lamentations, 
where strife and disorder (isfet) are described in terms of their muting effects on language. That 
there ‘are no words’ to describe suffering and chaos is not platitudinous, but literal—chaos 
disables the power of speech.31 In the Egyptian language, silence (sgr 𓋴𓎼𓂋𓏛) is related to 
violence (sgr 𓋴𓎼𓂋𓂡). Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be violent. This semantic 
interplay gives rise to all sorts of interesting metonymies in Egyptian soteriology, where the dead 
are ‘the silent ones’ (sgrw 𓋴𓎼𓂋𓅱𓀁), the tomb is ‘the city of silence’ (sgr.t 𓋴𓎼𓂋𓏏𓊖), etc. To die is 
                                                        
27 Instruction Addressed to King Merikare (Lichtheim 2006a, 97-112). 
28 Schenkel (1965, 426). 
29 The Apophis Book, as quoted in Sethe & Helck (1958, 961.13; 1958, 1172.13). 
30 The pun works in the other direction too: the maat is also on the khat, as ‘khat’ is a homophone for the sort of 
place for weighing (ḫt 𓆼𓐍𓄿𓏏𓉐) upon which one’s soul was measured against the feather of maat, i.e., the mḫꜣt-scale 
(𓍝). 
31 E.g., the Lamentation of Khakheperre-sonbe: “O that I might find unknown phrases, strange expressions, new 
speech not yet uttered, free of repetitions” (Simpson 1973, 231). 
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to be silenced, to lose one’s voice, to cease being spoken of. Immortality consists in being 
remembered and being reborn or recreated through having one’s name preserved.32 
This suggests that names enjoy a reified status in Egyptian thought. Things have ‘true’ 
and ‘proper’ names, the written expression of which is their mere ‘shadow’ (šwt 𓈙𓅱𓏏𓋼) but 
which may be damaged by external forces. As we saw above, it’s the name of the deceased 
person that waits in judgment for their heart-mind to be weighed against maat. In other texts, one 
of the worst fates to befall a person is for their name to ‘stink’ (mk bꜥḥ 𓅓𓂝𓎡𓃀𓂝𓎛𓆟𓀁).33 Many 
aspects of mortuary ritual were enactments of metaphysical preservation, with names playing an 
especially central role both in the funerary ceremonies themselves and in the regular liturgical 
observances that followed.34 To erase the name of a disgraced pharaoh from inscriptions was not 
simply propaganda. Such erasure was metaphysical: by causing a name to be forgotten, that 
name was thereby removed from membership in the ontology of things—a kind of “semantic 
homicide.”35 
 This is a reminder that hieroglyphs, being gifts from the gods36, were less concerned with 
the communication of information, which we today might see as the essence of language, but 
were instead involved in a ‘magical’ (ḥkꜣ 𓎛𓂓𓏛) performance that was taken to bring about the 
very realities the glyphs expressed. To inscribe hieroglyphs was to participate in those realities. 
Very few Egyptians were literate, after all, and even scribes may often have not understood what 
                                                        
32 This is perhaps an unorthodox way of interpreting Egyptian mortuary religion, which has tended instead to be 
understood as committed to proto-Christian soteriological categories such as a transcendent rebirth in an ‘afterlife’; 
but these latter preoccupations might reveal more about the post-Victorian heritage of Egyptology, emerging as it 
did out of Biblical studies, than about actual Egyptian ritual practice (Nyord 2018). 
33 This is the recurrent self-accusation voiced by the disgraced narrator in The Man Who Was Tired of Life (Simpson 
1973, 205-206). 
34 Daily recitation of the deceased’s name was performed by relatives (or commissioned professionals) at the tomb 
itself, at home, or in community shrines. For more on the distinction between funerary as opposed to mortuary 
observances in ancient Egypt, see Willems (2001). 
35 This excellent phrase is from Picardo (2007). 
36 The Memphite Theology tells us that “All divine speech [i.e., hieroglyphs] originated from that which was thought 
up by the heart and commanded by the tongue” (Lichtheim 2006a, 51-57). 
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they were copying, or if they did, it might not have occurred to them that the sacred words 
passed down to them could be recoupled in new ways to fit their whimsy.37 Writing hieroglyphs 
was not an act of describing or documenting, but of creative articulation.38 Such ritual words 
were “language offerings.”39 
This ontic dimension of Egyptian language is inextricably normative. Hieroglyphs and 
other ritual utterances reenact the original creation of the universe—the divinely-ordained way 
that things are supposed to be.40 For this reason, there is no pattern of life that is not infused with 
normativity in some way; there is nothing (at least nothing that can be spoken of) to which maat 
is extrinsic. Speaking in ritually-appropriate ways means speaking in a way that is faithful to the 
real established natures of things—the way that things were and are supposed to be. Speaking 
maat means saying that “the land is as it was at the first time.”41 Upholding maat means 
therefore to “speak truly” and “silence” chaos and evil.42 
As we saw earlier, in the Book of the Dead, the dead person’s name is the object of the 
verdict and the deceased is judged according to whether their confessional assertions accurately 
match their past deeds and intentions. The imagery here is of the heart-mind as a kind of tablet 
upon which thoughts are written, thereby becoming memories. Memory is what conditions 
expectations of the future and what ‘should’ happen; and thus, memory is closely connected to 
maat. Finding the right words to remember—to memorialize upon the tablet of one’s heart—is 
an act of moral creation. In the lamentation texts, chaos is characterized by an inability to engage 
                                                        
37 For an analysis of ancient Egyptian scribal training and practices, including evidence that both teacher and student 
were often ignorant of the meanings of what they copied, see Williams (1972). For more on how to understand 
‘literacy’ in an ancient Egyptian context, see Baines (2007, 33-62). 
38 See Roccati (2003). 
39 Assmann (1996, 208). 
40 Cf., Baines’s (1990) thesis about hieroglyphic expressibility being constrained by a principle of cosmic 
‘decorum’. 
41 Sethe & Helck (1958, 2026.19). 
42 Coffin Text 1130.  
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in this sort of moral generation. The turbulence of the present disrupts the continuity of past to 
future, thereby ‘casting maat out’ and leaving the heart ‘unable to speak.’ Without maat, there 
can be no language (ḏd 𓆓𓂧), for there would be no stability (ḏd 𓆓𓂧𓊽) upon which to ground 
shared meaning.43 
This also allows us to make more sense of the autobiographical formulae in which scribes 
assert that, “There is no word against me on earth among men, there is no accusation in the sky 
among the gods, for I have annulled the word against me.”44 It’s tempting to see such 
expressions as nothing more than preoccupations with the scribes’ reputations, and to read 
“annulling words against me” as simply having avoided or rebutted any slander against oneself. 
But as we have seen, within the Egyptian conception of ritual language, words have ontic 
repercussions; genuinely annulling a word against oneself must involve that word not actually 
being true to normative reality, i.e., not being in accordance with the ordained and eternally-valid 
way that things once were and are supposed to be. 
  Thus, the creative powers of maaty language can be thought of as ‘magical’ (heka), in 
that they are grounded in a conception of ritual as ontically efficacious.45 When a maaty speaks, 
she speaks in a ritually-appropriate way, and thus she speaks in a way that both hearkens to and 
recreates the ordained natures and true names of things.46 Such ‘magic’ connects maat to the 
central Egyptian ritual category of hu (ḥw 𓎛𓅱) or ‘authoritative utterance.’ When “hu is in one’s 
                                                        
43 See Assmann (1996, 143). 
44 Pyramid Text 302. 
45 If the connotations of the word ‘magic’ (the traditional translation for ḥkꜣ) trouble the sensibilities of the modern 
secular reader, see the excellent overview of the contested nature of that term as a hermeneutic category within 
Egyptology in Ritner (1993, 3-13). 
46 It’s important that the creative powers of specifically maaty language are not conflated with any old uttering 
whatsoever. Ritually-efficacious utterances (heka) are ‘god’s words’ (mdw nṯr 𓌃𓀁 𓊹). 
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mouth” then one’s speech becomes “the shrine of maat” and stability and eternity are 
reinforced.47 
 To speak with hu is to speak in a way that is unchanging, both in the sense of keeping 
true to one’s earlier words and in the sense of staying faithful to the natures of things as 
originally ordained by the gods. It is because the pharaoh speaks with hu that he has the moral 
authority that he does.48 Mortals can attain a similar moral authority by also channeling hu 
through participation in the ritual language of maat. In the Book of the Dead, the maat-aspirant is 
vindicated by knowing the correct ritual names for the divine aspects of maat, and thus speaks 
with hu in a way that even the gods respect and fear (snṯ 𓅾𓀁).49 
 Someone’s success as a maaty may be contested or obscure during their own lifetime, but 
their moral virtue can be ascertained through a kind of ethical autopsy in the form of a special 
ceremony in which a mummy or other symbolic stand-in for the deceased would have its mouth 
ritually opened.50 In addition to providing a symbolic way to feed the spirit of the deceased, this 
ritual also let the deceased symbolically speak. And when the deceased speaks during this 
ceremony, it is in the voice of hu, and therefore maat.51 It’s not that everyone who dies is 
universally virtuous, and therefore speaks with maat when their mouths are ritually opened. 
Rather, it’s that the ritual action of the ceremony itself plays a causal role in making the deceased 
a maaty. For if one was beloved enough or influential enough to have one’s descendants go 
                                                        
47 Book of the Dead 17 (Budge 1895, 35-37). The connection with stability and eternity is expressed in Pyramid Text 
255. The language about hu being in the mouth, etc. is quoted in Gardiner (1916, 50). Blackman (1945) suggests 
that hu in the sense of generative, divine language is semantically as well as liturgically connected with the 
homophone and homonym ḥw 𓎛𓅱, referring to food and the sense of taste generally, insofar as food offerings were 
sanctified with ritual language. 
48 See Pyramid Text 401, where the relationship between the pharaoh and hu is also described symmetrically, with 
the pharaoh listening to the words that a personified deity Hu (ḥw 𓎛𓅱𓊹) speaks to him. 
49 Book of the Dead 78 (Ani Papyrus, plate 25; Budge 1895, 156-57). 
50 The Opening of the Mouth ceremony is described in the Book of the Dead 17 (Budge 1895, 35-37). For 
comprehensive documentation and analysis of the various depictions and episodes of the ceremony, see Otto (1960).  
51 Coffin Text 816. 
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through the effort of the ceremony, that very fact rebounds to one’s moral character. The 
attitudes and memories which others have regarding us are realities not merely of those others; 
they are (post-mortem) realities about ourselves as well.52 
This helps us see how maat can be understood as both justice and truth. Truth, on this 
account, is faithfulness to the primeval order. It is not correspondence to how things are, but to 
how things were and ought to be. Truth is normative in this way, and so takes on an aspect of 
justice in a coordinative sense: maat involves balancing (literally) names and deeds, and 
(re)syncing things with their ordained natures. 
 
3. Realist or Anti-Realist? 
 Can such an ancient category teach us anything new today, and can contemporary 
metaethicists offer anything that can aid Egyptologists in the recovery of maat? To address these 
questions, we shall have to see whether maat can be situated within the debates and taxonomies 
of contemporary metaethics. 
There are aspects of maat that pull in both realist and anti-realist directions. In the realist 
direction, we have the fact that no one can really alter maat insofar as it is based in the true 
natures of things as ordained in the primeval creation. Maaty language and practice are always 
compliant recreations of this original normative order. So, in this way, maat is deeply mind-
independent. Indeed, even the gods themselves are largely passive perpetuators of maat’s 
independent reality: they merely “pass on what has been told to them” of maat by its personified 
                                                        
52 A plausible comparison here is to Aristotle’s famous claim about one’s eudaimonia being vulnerable to things that 
may outlive one or occur after one’s death (Nicomachean Ethics I.11). See also Assmann (1996) who argues that the 
Egyptian sense of selfhood is ‘constellational’, in the sense that a person’s metaphysical identity is intermingled 
with others on whom she socially depends (although Assmann does not develop that argument on the basis of either 
hu or the Opening of the Mouth Ceremony specifically). 
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voice—a moral authority all the gods fear.53 Thus, maat seems resistant to any kind of divine 
command or voluntarist classification. 
Furthermore, maat seems an unlikely candidate for naturalistic analysis.54 As we’ve seen, 
maat is intimately bound up with divine forces and entities—maat was itself deified—that would 
seem to resist physical or scientific reduction. And if naturalism is to substantively contrast with 
anything, it’s gods.55 Thus, if maat pulls in the direction of realism, it would seem to be a quite 
‘robust’ realism in virtue of its mind-independence and its non-naturalism.56 However, one of the 
necessary conditions for a position to be robustly realist by contemporary standards is that it 
adhere to some version of a correspondence theory of truth, according to which being true (for at 
least some moral truths) is determined by some truth-maker that is existentially prior to and 
independent of the content of the truth-bearer in question. This kind of correspondence is thus 
committed to a dyadic relationship between mind and world, a relationship that keeps separate 
the mind-independent truth-makers (e.g., facts) from the mind-dependent truth-bearers (e.g., 
propositions). All card-carrying realists of sufficiently high levels of robustness agree with this 
priority and independence.57 
                                                        
53 Book of the Dead 78 (Ani Papyrus, plate 25; Budge 1895, 155-57). 
54 It will depend, of course, on how we understand what it is to be ‘naturalistic’. (See Flanagan 2006 for a more 
comprehensive taxonomy of naturalism in ethics.) There are several ways in which, for instance, maat was taken to 
exist in the physical world, e.g., in the form of its incarnation as the feather against which one’s heart-mind (again, 
conceived as a physical thing) is weighed (again, literally), and as the audible sounds expressed when the mouth of 
the deceased is ritually opened. Rather than try to settle whether maat is or is not naturalistic, I suggest the real 
lesson here for metaethicists is to recognize the variations in how the natural world is distinguished from the 
supernatural in the first place, which suggests that ‘natural’ is not a natural kind. 
55 Such a minimum threshold is part of what has been thought to constitute the ‘charm’ of the naturalist program 
(Stroud 1996). There are, however, those who allow for theistic varieties of naturalism—Adams (1979) has referred 
to his divine command theory as a kind of ethical naturalism, for instance—and such a possibility is left open by 
Pigden’s (1991) formative definition of ethical naturalism as involving the reduction of values merely to “something 
else” (left unspecified).  
56 See Enoch (2011: 4). ‘Robust’ realists title themselves thusly as a way of distinguishing their view from ‘minimal’ 
realisms that might be more consistent with naturalism, constructivism, or response-dependence. 
57 Rogues’ gallery of robust realists, and where they talk about or presuppose correspondence: Shafer-Landau (2003, 
15-17), Wedgwood (2004, 410-12), Oddie (2005, 1-19), Enoch (2011, 2-8), and last and least DeLapp (2013, 18-
23). 
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If we are correspondentists, as we must be to qualify as robust realists, we should see our 
job as epistemic agents to be the alignment of our beliefs with the external facts. By contrast, 
when we think of maat as involving ‘correspondence’ to the primeval normative order, we’re no 
longer talking about correspondence in the same sense. For the primeval normative order is not 
merely inertly out there and moral agents are not ontologically passive with respect to it. Instead, 
the primeval normative order is itself a product of active linguistic creation and recreation. 
Maaty are not merely tweaking their beliefs to bring them in-sync with facts; they are also at the 
same time constituting (or re-constituting) those facts. This is still dyadic in a sense, but not in 
the robust realist’s sense. Instead of mind-independent truth-makers and mind-dependent truth-
bearers, with maat we have mind-dependent truth-makers (namely, the generative utterances of 
hu) but mind-independent truth-bearers (insofar as the language of ritual must be faithful to the 
natures ordained by the primeval creation). For example, when a tomb inscription avows that its 
occupant in life had acted “as a son to the aged, father to the child, protector of the poor” or had 
judged a dispute fairly and mercifully58, the robust realist would view these as propositional 
claims that, in order to be true, would need to correspond to independent historical facts about 
the deceased. In the moral semantics of maat, however, the inscription itself must be treated as 
one of the relevant facts: it is formulated according to ritual rules and it testifies to the caring 
memories that ancestors (who oversee the inscription itself and also reenact it in subsequent 
mortuary commemorations) have about the deceased. Thus, the inscription possesses the moral 
authority of hu and (‘magically’) makes it true that the deceased was the good person he is being 
memorialized as. 
This reveals a way in which, despite other affinities, maat fits very awkwardly into our 
modern taxonomies of moral realism. Perhaps we’ll do better to see it as a kind of anti-realism. 
                                                        
58 Lichtheim (1992, 27-28). 
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After all, maat is fundamentally linguistic, a feature more commonly associated with modern 
anti-realism. As we’ve seen, being a maaty is at root a linguistic achievement. It involves being 
able to clear one’s name from imputations, successfully assert the ritual litany of negative 
confessions before the tribunal of the gods, and have one’s mouth opened post-mortem through 
the proper ceremony. The absence of maat is the absence of proper speech, and vice versa. In 
virtue of these dimensions, maat is also deeply interpersonal and relational. Being a maaty means 
being remembered and spoken of well by posterity. Truth, the other extension of maat, is created 
precisely through these linguistic and social acts: the original cosmic creation was through 
linguistic fiat by the divine, and mortals bring about realities through the ritual words they utter 
or inscribe. 
 All of these linguistic features might suggest that maat has anti-realist contours. The 
modern metaethicist asks, “What specific kind of anti-realism?” Given that we’ve just seen that 
maat has pronounced realist dimensions too, the best anti-realist analog could be so-called quasi-
realism, as most prominently defended by Simon Blackburn; for what’s supposed to be 
distinctive of quasi-realism is that it’s as close to realism as one can get without bringing in 
extra-linguistic moral facts. In the remainder of this section, then, I’ll briefly explicate quasi-
realism and show how this makes sense of many elements of maat. The comparison will leave us 
with an interesting remainder, however, which I will argue reveals a neglected point of contact 
between realism and anti-realism. Ultimately, it’s not that maat is (or is not) a feature of a 
language-independent world, and is therefore realist (or anti-realist); rather, in the Egyptian way 
of thinking, it’s that the world itself is language-dependent in a way that disrupts key aspects of 
the modern realist/anti-realist dichotomy. 
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 I take quasi-realism to involve three commitments. The first is a commitment to 
naturalism. Blackburn expresses this commitment by asserting that the raison d’être for 
metaethics is the “question of explanation, of ‘placing’ our propensity for ethics within a 
satisfactory naturalistic view of ourselves.”59 Such a view will presuppose that “there is none 
except a natural science of human beings.”60 The reader may be understandably surprised here 
by the claim that maat may be compared to quasi-realism if we’ve already seen the ways in 
which maat is not naturalistic. Bear with me. As we’ll see, the fact that maat follows other key 
commitments of quasi-realism, even if not its naturalism, reveals something interesting about the 
internal logic of the quasi-realist position. 
 The second commitment of quasi-realism is non-cognitivism. Instead of asserting 
propositions, moral language expresses some kind of attitudinal or affective states which may 
then be foisted onto the world.61 It’s quite plausible to see maat as a version of non-cognitivism. 
The fact that maat rejects correspondentist truth would seem to require that maat must also reject 
cognitivism, insofar as all cognitivists must be correspondentists. More specifically, maaty 
language is not engaged in asserting propositions as truth-bearers that can be true or false in 
relation to any facts independent of that language itself. It’s through the very act of speaking in 
the ritually appropriate ways (namely, with hu and heka) that moral ‘facts’ are generated. There 
are no truth-makers for maaty discourse outside that discourse itself.62 
                                                        
59 Blackburn (1993, 208). 
60 Blackburn (1993, 166). 
61 It’s in virtue of such foisting that quasi-realism is sometimes also described as a kind of ‘projectivism’. 
62 I’m focusing here on the fact that there are no moral truth-makers independent of maaty linguistic discourse. But 
we could also point to putatively cognitivist aspects of maaty discourse, such as the fact that, in addition to hu, it 
must involve sia, ‘understanding’ (siꜣ 𓋷𓀁). This still won’t get us cognitivism by modern standards, because 
cognitivism implies correspondentist truth, to which maat is unsuited. But emphasizing the sia component of maat 
might mitigate how extreme a form of non-cognitivism we read into maat. Resolving the question of whether maat 
is ultimately cognitivist or non-cognitivist will come down to how we choose to divide beliefs from desires, a 
division which is not obviously recognized in all intellectual traditions. 
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 What distinguishes quasi-realism from other anti-realisms is its third commitment, that 
the expression of non-cognitive states provides an acceptable functional equivalent to realist 
moral discourse.63 Since realists are cognitivists, their moral discourse will have a degree of 
logical stability and structure in virtue of its propositional content (in conjunction with rational 
requirements). Quasi-realism is supposed to mimic this stability and structure, but without 
viewing moral discourse as having genuine propositional content. The functional equivalence is 
supposed to obtain at all levels of discourse, including the psychological level (quasi-realists 
truly feel their moral commitments in as serious a way as do robust realists) and the linguistic 
level (quasi-realists can convincingly use all the same moral predicates and hortatory injunctions 
as realists, passing a sort of metaethical Turing Test). The mimicry of realism at all these levels 
is what’s quasi about quasi-realism. 
 This preoccupation with logical stability and structure is part of quasi-realism’s response 
to the so-called Frege-Geach Problem, the problem of explaining how moral arguments can still 
follow deductive inference patterns despite not being propositional.64 In this paper, I’m not 
interested in evaluating whether or not the Frege-Geach Problem is resolvable by quasi-realists. 
Rather, what’s relevant to the present discussion is that it is precisely because quasi-realists take 
concerns about stable moral discourse so seriously that Frege-Geach is considered a problem by 
them in the first place. For if we weren’t concerned with stable moral discourse, then it shouldn’t 
bother us to concede that there is no deductive validity in the non-cognitivist readings of Frege-
Geach. Moral discourse would just be a matter of different individuals expressing different 
                                                        
63 This at least is what ‘modest’ quasi-realists aspire to. More ‘ambitious’ quasi-realists, such as Blackburn himself, 
aren’t satisfied merely with talking as if there were moral truths; they want to insist that there definitely are moral 
truths (even if those truths are given the sort of deflationary parsing discussed below). For the modest/ambitious 
division within quasi-realism, see Miller (2003, 77-81). 
64 For an accessible and comprehensive overview of the Frege-Geach problem, see Schroeder (2008a). 
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attitudes willy-nilly. But quasi-realists do take such stability seriously, and they want to find a 
way of securing it without defecting to cognitivism. 
One of the ways quasi-realists have attempted to do this is by embracing a deflationary 
account of moral truth. According to the deflationary account, the invocation of truth in moral 
discourse adds nothing metaphysical that the discourse wasn’t already committed to. Appending 
‘is true’ to a moral utterance is merely a different way of articulating that utterance, perhaps 
more forcefully. Quasi-realists appeal to deflationary truth in order to imitate the stability and 
structure of realist discourse without the metaphysical baggage of independent truth-makers for 
moral sentences.65 In the absence of independent truth-makers, this stability might be secured by 
certain epistemic and linguistic constraints—such as warranted assertibility or the satisfaction of 
whatever platitudes we have about the meaning of truth66—that govern what a speaker can and 
cannot get away with communicating, according to whatever are the rules of the particular 
language game they’re playing. These rules are ultimately conventional, but they’re not arbitrary 
and they can’t be whimsically broken by participants, at least not if they wish to be understood 
by other players. The rules have all the stability and structure of the language-games of which 
they’re a part, and that stability is all the quasi-realist needs in order to imitate the logical 
stability which regular realist discourse already has in virtue of its propositional content. 
Appealing to such epistemic or linguistic constraints would amount to what Blackburn calls 
‘fast-tracking’ quasi-realism.67 Fully fleshing out precisely how those constraints operate in the 
case of moral discourse will require the much wonkier ‘slow-track’ labor of developing a new 
                                                        
65 Blackburn and other prominent expressivists (e.g., Gibbard 1990) embrace deflationism. Granted, Wright (1992) 
and Horwich (1990) both claim that their versions of deflationism (‘minimalism’) are incompatible with 
expressivism. But I view Michael Smith (1994), Dreier (2010), and Price (2015) as convincing arguments not only 
that expressivism and deflationism are compatible, but that the former actually relies upon the latter. 
66 Such constraints are most famously developed by Wright (1992). 
67 The distinction between ‘fast-track’ and ‘slow-track’ ways of working out the deflationary aspects of quasi-
realism is from Blackburn (1993, 184-86). 
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logic of attitudes, since on the quasi-realist picture of moral discourse, the expression of moral 
attitudes is supposed to replace the assertion of propositions.68  
Comparing maat to this final commitment of quasi-realism—namely, the stability of 
moral discourse—reveals something interesting about both maat and quasi-realism. Maat shares 
with quasi-realism a deep commitment to stability and structure within moral discourse. 
However, maat secures that stability and structure in a very different way than does quasi-
realism. Maaty language is an enactment of ritual and, in that context, it is vitally important that 
the agent accurately adhere to or reproduce the specific words, glyphs, and formulae that 
constitute the primeval normative order. That’s the only way that moral language gets the 
‘magical’ (heka) powers or moral authority (hu) that is has. This ritual adherence guarantees an 
analog of warranted or super-assertibility, serving as a structural constraint on discourse, which 
is precisely what quasi-realists wish to do. But making sense of maaty ritual constraints does not 
require establishing a whole new logic of attitudes. Thus, maat gives us an even greater degree of 
discourse stability and at a cheaper theoretic price compared to quasi-realism, while still keeping 
faith with quasi-realism’s commitments to non-cognitivism and non-correspondentism. 
 What about quasi-realism’s appeal to deflationism? Recall that the whole reason quasi-
realists are attracted to deflationism is that they reject cognitivism. That is, they want there to be 
stability and structure to our moral discourse that’s due to something other than propositional 
content anchored to mind-independent truth-makers. For these reasons, as we’ve seen, quasi-
realism seems almost to entail deflationism. Maat, by contrast, is not so easily deflated. There is 
nothing minimal or anti-metaphysical about maat: when a maaty speaks, the truths that result are 
robustly ontic. 
                                                        
68 See Schroeder (2008b) and Weintraub (2011) for sophisticated efforts to develop such a logic. 
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We can appreciate this distinction between maaty discourse and deflationary discourse by 
attending to the sorts of speech acts each discourse involves. When it comes to creating moral 
reality through language, quasi-realists can see moral speech as illocutionary.69 When I say “I do 
hereby solemnly swear,” I am ipso facto making a promise—that’s the illocutionary dimension 
of my utterance. Just so, according to quasi-realists, when I say “Murder is wrong,” although the 
locution itself is grammatically propositional/cognitivist, that’s merely a front for the 
illocutionary act of expressing an attitude. And for the quasi-realist, moral truths consist just in 
such expression. But maaty language is not like this. When the maaty says “I am attentive 
without equal, a good listener, well spoken”70 or “I never let anyone spend the night angry with 
me about something,”71 she is not just expressing attitudes (though she may be doing that too). 
Her utterance has an additional ontic power that the quasi-realist cannot accommodate; for the 
maaty’s utterance does bring about a moral reality that is mind-independent in the sense that it 
recreates a primeval normative order over which the maaty ritual agent has no control. Thus, 
while the quasi-realist sees moral language mainly in an illocutionary light, maaty language 
additionally recognizes perlocutionary dimensions, in that it brings about real external effects all 
by itself. Illocutionary force might fail to be realized, as when someone is not successfully 
intimidated by your attempted intimidation. But a perlocutionary act always succeeds by 
definition; if an utterance didn’t have an outward effect, then it simply wasn’t a perlocutionary 
act at all.72 
To summarize, although both realism and quasi-realism approximate different aspects of 
maat, neither one is an exact fit. Instead, with maat, we have an exciting new metaphysical 
                                                        
69 Searle (1975) classes the expression of attitudes as a kind of illocutionary act. 
70 Stela of Mentuhotep (Cairo Museum 20539), line 8; quoted from Lichtheim (1997, 79). 
71 Giza inscription from tomb of priest Wr-ḥww, quoted from Lichtheim (1992, 9). 
72 Austin (1955, 121) phrases this difference between perlocution and illocution in terms of the former being 
‘natural’ (i.e., creates tangible effects in the natural world) and the latter being ‘conventional’. 
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combination: it is non-cognitivist without being naturalistic, it secures the desired stability and 
structure of moral discourse in a theoretically simpler way than quasi-realists can, and it does so 
moreover without needing to either metaphysically deflate truth or invoke discourse-independent 
facts. 
 
4. Lessons for Modern Metaethicists 
 All this being said, I am not saying that maat should be the ultimately correct metaethics. 
The magical conception of language that undergirds maat is likely foreign and perhaps 
implausible to many contemporary metaethicists. Yet, even if we are not persuaded to adopt 
maaty metaethics, there are still important lessons which modern metaethicists can take away 
from this comparative endeavor. 
First, maat should remind us that metaethics need not be as disconnected from first-order 
normative considerations nor actual lived experience as it is sometimes taken to be. Maat, after 
all, intersects all levels of morality: it is metaethical in its ontic and linguistic aspects, yet it also 
plays roles in political critique and ethical exhortation, and it has embodied expression through 
ritual practices. The question of what relationship, if any, metaethical positions have or should 
have to normative theory, applied ethics, and moral phenomenology has been a vexing one for 
contemporary theorists.73 But for the most part, metaethical theorizing has tended to be 
unrecognizable to everyday moral agents and irrelevant to even other levels of moral 
philosophizing. The interpenetration of all levels of morality by a category such as maat can help 
                                                        
73 Some realists have argued for a reconnection of metaethics with these other levels of morality, e.g., Kramer’s 
(2009) argument that moral realism is itself a first-order moral position. Anti-realists have instead tended to embrace 
a disconnect with other levels of morality. The whole point of Joyce’s (2001) fictionalism, for example, is that what 
is metaethically fictional is nevertheless still efficacious at the first-order level. And Blackburn himself stresses that 
his quasi-realist can still talk, behave, and feel in ways indistinguishable (except metaethically) from individuals of 
realist persuasions. 
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modern-day metaethicists appreciate possible points of contact between a metaethical theory and 
other facets of moral life. 
Second, maat exposes many of the presumed orthodoxies of modern-day metaethics to be 
culturally contingent. We might believe that the only way to be a non-cognitivist is to think of 
moral language as the expression of attitudes, but maat helps us see a different way of arriving at 
non-cognitivism, which really does not have much to do with non-cognitivist attitudes, but 
instead proceeds via the rejection of correspondentism. Similarly, the modern taxonomist might 
presuppose that all non-cognitivists are naturalists, or that all expressivists are deflationists. 
Taking maat seriously helps us see past these limitations, opening up possibilities for new 
metaethical hybrids. This can be especially attractive for anyone who might like most but not all 
of quasi-realism, or for someone who might lean strongly toward robust realism but harbor 
misgivings about correspondentist truth. 
A third benefit modern-day metaethicists can take away from the study of maat is a new 
frontier for thinking about the philosophy of language. We have in ancient Egypt a very 
distinctive conception of the essence and purpose of language. Hieroglyphic language—the ritual 
language of normativity—is non-naturalistic and it is not primarily aimed at locution or the 
conveyance of information. Maaty discourse is perlocutionary through and through. This is not 
merely a conception of language as being capable of manifesting tangible extra-linguistic effects. 
Rather, it is a conception of language as deeply intertwined with the nature of reality and 
normativity. This is to view language as a kind of “material engagement…not merely a means 
but a very way of being.”74 
 To conclude, maat was a fascinating metaethical achievement of ancient Egypt and 
modern-day philosophers have much to learn by undertaking a comparative study of it. This 
                                                        
74 Elias & Gallagher (2014, 382), though they do not touch on ancient Egyptian language specifically. 
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study reveals new ways of combining alternative accounts of language, nature, and truth—the 
building blocks of metaethical positions. In seeking to recover the metaethical heritage of Egypt, 
we might find encouragement in Plato’s recommendation to look to history for both 
philosophical inspiration and humility. In the Timaeus, we are told a story about Solon who, after 
bragging about the accomplishments of his own modern civilization, is rightly chastened by an 
Egyptian philosopher for his failure to appreciate the precedence of antiquity. Like Solon, by 
neglecting comparative philosophy we run the risk of “becoming infants all over 
again…completely unfamiliar with anything there was in ancient times.”75 
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